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Does reporting transparency affect industry coordination?  
Evidence from the duration of international cartels 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In product markets, firms have incentives to coordinate their actions, raise prices above the 
competitive level, and share collective profits, because industry coordination decreases the strategic 
uncertainties originating from competitive pressure (Stigler 1964).  However, firms face a trade-off:  
Coordination among firms is sustained only as long as the collective returns from cooperation outweigh 
the short-term private returns from defection (Dick 1996).  While economic theory predicts that financial 
reporting transparency affects this trade-off, no prior evidence exists as to whether transparency either 
facilitates industry coordination through increased contracting efficiency or impedes industry 
coordination due to the earlier detection of deviating members.  We exploit an international sample of 
firms that have been indicted by the European Commission (EC) for forming illegal cartels.  The use of 
cartels allows us to observe the nature and duration of industry coordination, and to examine how 
reporting transparency affects industry coordination and competition. 
To derive our predictions, we combine theories explaining the sustainability of cartels with the 
literature on the role of accounting information in contracting (Ball et al. 2008; Stigler 1964).  Contracting 
theory suggests that transparency is a mechanism for reducing contracting costs by making readily 
available the information necessary for monitoring, enforcing, and verifying a cartel agreement (e.g., 
Williamson 1973).  Leslie (2004) concludes that contracting costs hinder firms in oligopolistic markets 
from forming cartels.  Because disaggregated accounting information is used for allocating and 
monitoring production quotas within the cartel, reporting transparency may decrease contracting costs by 
allowing for more efficient contracting between agents (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lambert 2001; 
Hölmstrom 1979; Watts and Zimmerman 1986).  Anecdotally, cartel members use publicly available 
audited financial information both to verify self-reported sales and to enforce the cartel agreement 
(Harrington Jr. 2006; Harrington Jr. and Skrzypacz 2011).  Similarly, cartel regulators argue that 




(OECD 2010).  Thus, by decreasing contracting costs, reporting transparency may increase cartel 
duration.  
Unlike debt and compensation contracts, implicit cartel contracts lack legal standing; instead, they 
depend upon self-enforcement by the cartel members.  Game theory suggests that industry coordination is 
an example of prisoner’s dilemma (Pepall et al. 2005):  Given that the opportunity costs of cooperation 
are high for individual firms, cartel members are tempted to employ the short-term strategy of cheating 
(Roberts 1985).  Transparent reporting provides cartel members the means for verifying self-reported 
numbers and thus leads to earlier detection of cheating.  Upon the discovery of cheating, the other cartel 
members can either invest in deterrence mechanisms or punish the cheating members (Levenstein 1997).  
The first option raises deterrence costs, which reduce the collective returns from collusion (Abreu et al. 
1991) and can cause a cartel to break up (Stigler 1964).  The second option leads to a price war, which 
destabilizes cartels (Levenstein 1997).  Thus, when cartel members cheat, financial reporting transparency 
may decrease cartel duration by making collusion costly to sustain.   
We hypothesize financial reporting transparency can decrease cartel duration when cartel members 
cheat, because transparency enhances the cartel members’ ability to detect deviations from the cartel 
agreement.  When cartel members do not defect or when cartels have effective mechanisms for dealing 
with cheating, financial reporting transparency may increase cartel duration and help cartel members 
sustain the cartel agreement through the provision of credible and verifiable sources of public 
information.  We test these predictions using the requirement to report under internationally recognized 
accounting standards as our measure of reporting transparency.  We designate U.S. GAAP, IFRS, and 
IFRS’ predecessor IAS, as transparent accounting standards, arguing that they provide three benefits for 
enforcing cartel agreements (hereafter, we use IFRS to mean both IAS and IFRS).   
First, the disclosure literature shows that these accounting standards demand higher levels of 
disclosure than local GAAP (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Daske and Gebhardt 2006).  Specifically, they 
mandate disclosure of disaggregated segment information (e.g., SFAS 131, IAS 14), while local GAAP 




(Doblin 1943), cartel members can use segment reporting to allocate market shares and to compare 
agreed-upon market shares to reported sales for a given product or region.  While transparent segment 
reporting can facilitate contracting, it also reveals any deviations from the cartel agreement.  Second, 
transparent accounting standards facilitate the comparison of financial information across markets in 
global cartels (Brochet et al. 2013).  Third, transparent accounting standards mitigate earnings 
management, thereby reducing the possibilities of hiding cheating and increasing the contracting 
relevance of accounting information (Barth et al. 2008; González et al. 2015).  
We test our predictions using an international sample of price-fixing cartels convicted of violating 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU).  Using the Cox proportional 
hazard model, we find that reporting transparency is associated with a lower cartel duration.  This result is 
consistent with the notion that transparent reporting on average leads to earlier detection of cheating, 
thereby increasing the costs of deterrence and the likelihood of a price war.  In supplemental tests, we 
show that this finding is explained (in part) by transparent segment disclosure, which provides a means 
for the verification of agreed-upon sales for a given product or region.  Specifically, we find that firms 
report a greater number of segments when they follow U.S. GAAP and IFRS than when they follow local 
GAAP.  We also find that the increase in the number of reported segments is associated with the lower 
cartel duration.  However, when cartel firms constantly reclassify information across business segments 
as González et al. (2015) found, the resulting opacity of segment information extends the cartel lifespan.  
To further support the role of reporting transparency in cheating discovery, we exploit cross-
sectional variation in the likelihood of cheating and the cartel response to cheating.  The economic 
literature predicts that cartel members are more likely to defect when a cartel lacks effective means of 
enforcing the cartel agreement and when the costs that other cartel members impose on the cheating firm 
are low (Levenstein and Suslow 2006).  Furthermore, cheating is more likely when cartel members have 
heterogeneous cost structures, because more profitable firms can afford a larger price cut and can gain a 




Using empirical proxies for the likelihood of cheating, we find that transparent reporting is 
associated with decreases in cartel duration when cartel members are likely to cheat, and that transparent 
reporters experience a decrease in cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating increases.  While these 
results strongly suggest that transparent reporting reduces cartel duration because it reveals cheating, we 
do not find any significant results for the contracting benefits of transparent reporting or an increase in 
cartel duration for transparent reporters when the likelihood of cheating is relatively low.  This result 
supports the view that transparent reporting predominantly affects cartel duration by allowing the cartel 
members to more effectively monitor the non-enforceable cartel agreement and to detect cheating.   
However, our failure to find any contracting benefits of transparent reporting may be also explained by 
the overall frequency of cheating, which is even greater in our sample of failed cartels, because cheating 
is the dominant short-term strategy and the cartels that broke up are more likely to have cheated.1  If 
cheating is widespread, our empirical tests may fail to provide a powerful test of whether transparent 
reporting has some contracting benefits in the cartel setting.2 
We employ a battery of sensitivity checks to rule out alternative explanations for our results.  To 
alleviate endogeneity concerns stemming from cartel members’ voluntary IFRS adoption, we endogenize 
the cartel members’ voluntary choice of using IFRS.  We also exploit heterogeneity in the transparency of 
(mandatory) local GAAP, the requirement that listed U.S. firms use U.S. GAAP, and the requirement to 
report business segments.  Furthermore, because we can only observe indicted cartels, our sampling 
procedure is not random, and our results may be affected by the regulator’s involvement.  To control for 
this selection bias, we use the two-stage Heckman estimation method, while also showing that our results 
are robust to using the sub-sample of cartels that dissolved before the start of the investigation by the 
regulator.  While our tests use fixed effects and explicit controls for country, industry, firm, and time-
specific factors, standard concerns with analyses involving a heterogeneous sample of firms imply that 
our results should be regarded as suggestive, not conclusive. 
                                                 
1 In-depth case studies of cartels find that cheating plays some role in the demise of up to 60 percent of examined cartel 
cases (Levenstein and Suslow 2006; Eckbo 1976; Griffin 2000).  
2 While we can identify cartels with characteristics that make cheating increasingly unlikely, “switching off” the effect of 




As our paper is the first to provide evidence on how reporting transparency affects industry 
coordination and product market competition, our contribution is threefold.  First, we add to prior work 
on the relation between firms’ competitive environment and the level of reporting transparency 
(Verrecchia 2001; Datta et al. 2013).  These studies examine the effect of competition on the quantity and 
quality of disclosure (Verrecchia 2001) or earnings management (Datta et al. 2013).  Consistent with 
theoretical predictions in Bagnoli and Watts (2010), we show that the reverse effect is possible and that 
reporting transparency can affect industry coordination and competition through enhanced monitoring 
ability.   
Second, our study adds to the literature on the verification role of audited financial statements (Ball 
et al. 2012; Lisowsky et al. 2017; Minnis 2011; Minnis and Sutherland 2017).  We contribute to this 
literature by showing that the verification role of audited financial reporting extends to non-enforceable 
contracts.  Third, by explicitly considering the effect of transparency on cartel duration, we contribute to 
the economic literature that analyzes cartel duration and its determinants (Suslow 2005; Levenstein and 
Suslow 2011).  From a policy standpoint, transparent reporting—because it fosters competition by 
reducing cartel sustainability—may have positive consumer welfare implications.  Therefore, our results 
contribute to the debate on whether transparent reporting can influence efficient resource allocation in an 
economy (Bushman et al. 2011).  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section II reviews the cartel setting, section III develops our 
hypotheses, and section IV reports on the sample selection.  Section V presents the main empirical results, 
which are followed by robustness tests in section VI.  Section VII concludes. 
II. THE CARTEL SETTING 
In competitive product markets, firms coordinate their actions because firms determine industry 
prices and outputs conditional on the actions of their rivals.  Collusion is widespread because it obviates 
the uncertainties of independent actions and reduces the complexity of interdependencies between firms 
(Asch and Seneca 1976).  Collusion varies in degree, from the sole expectation that a rival will not act 




agreement only as long as its rivals do (cartels) (Lipczynski et al. 2005).  Successful collusion is 
sustainable as long as the firm’s share of long-term collusion profits is higher than the short-term gain of 
deviation from collusion (Dick 1996).  
A cartel is an implicit agreement between firms in the same industry to fix prices or industry outputs, 
to allocate territories, or to divide profits (OECD 2007).  The key measure of cartel success is duration.  A 
number of studies show that average cartel duration varies from 6 to 11 years, depending on sample 
composition (Zimmerman and Connor 2005; Levenstein and Suslow 2011; De 2010).  Cartel members 
seek to act collectively, as if they were a single monopolist, thereby maximizing the collective profit.  By 
doing so, cartels violate competition policy and severely reduce consumer welfare through price-fixing 
activities that increase the price of goods far beyond the competitive level (Tirole 1988).  Recent evidence 
shows that the average price overcharges by cartels prosecuted by U.S. and EU cartel authorities were 
48.4 and 32.2 percent, respectively (Connor 2014).  The total fines that the EC imposed on cartels in the 
period 1990–2015 amounted to €21 billion.  However, this amount is only a small fraction of the 
estimated $1.5 trillion in damages caused by international cartels over the same period (Connor 2014).  
The salient feature of cartel agreements—that they are not enforceable in court and that therefore 
only cartel members can enforce them—leads to a strong demand for monitoring activities.  However, 
given each cartel member’s temptation to deceive the other members by undercutting the agreed-upon 
collusive price, enforcement is difficult (Suslow 2005; Stigler 1964).  Therefore, early cartel studies view 
cartel members as police officers that punish any deviators, concluding that a price war must erupt 
whenever a co-conspirator deviates (e.g., Green and Porter 1984).  Recent studies attempt to explain the 
existence of different stabilizing mechanisms that cartels employ, such as further information gathering, 
involving third-party monitors, and taking away firms’ ability to quickly implement operating changes 
(Harrington Jr. and Skrzypacz 2007; Sannikov and Skrzypacz 2007).  However, Abreu et al. (1986) show 
that cheating and the mechanisms cartel members implement to circumvent it raise the cost of deterrence 




As cartel members cannot directly observe one another’s production levels, they need to gather 
further information to verify whether their co-conspirators are sticking to the agreed-upon quantities or 
prices (Green and Porter 1984).  Because prices cannot be observed in wholesale markets, they cannot be 
used for monitoring cartel agreements.3  Importantly, prices depend on total market supply and thus tell 
us little about the actions of individual cartel members (Sannikov and Skrzypacz 2007).  To monitor the 
cartel agreement effectively, cartel members need information, summarized in the form of firm sales, on 
the output and prices set by individual cartel members.  Therefore, Harrington Jr. and Skrzypacz (2007, 
314) conclude that cartels “go to great lengths to ensure that sales are public information among the cartel 
members.”  Furthermore, Sannikov and Skrzypacz (2007) show that collusion would be impossible if 
monitoring used only information on total market supply (e.g., prices) rather than on individual decisions 
such as firm sales.  Consequently, the availability of financial information is a necessary condition for 
cartel formation.  
Published financial statements provide a number of advantages in the cartel setting.  They report 
information on total sales as well as product and regional sales, so that cartel members can allocate 
outputs or territories within the cartel and verify information about individual production and sales 
decisions.  Disaggregate accounting information is used in production-related contract clauses, which help 
cartels in allocating sales and production according to each cartel members’ production efficiency 
(Hyytinen et al. 2017).  The accounting information can also help cartels estimate the potential additional 
market supply from non-member rivals and allow those cartels to adopt their policies and the allocation 
method to threats from new entrants (Fink et al. 2017).  While much of the literature focuses on the 
importance of sales data, Athey and Bagwell (2001) show that allocation methods can achieve production 
efficiency only if cartel members (truthfully) communicate cost information.  Because published financial 
statements provide the data necessary for sustaining and monitoring the cartel agreement, the members of 
the “Carbonless Paper Cartel” used other cartel members’ financial statements to verify the accuracy of 
internally self-reported sales (Harrington Jr. and Skrzypacz 2011).   
                                                 




Although cartel members meet secretly to coordinate their actions and exchange information, a high 
degree of mistrust in the self-reported information exists.  For example, the “Amino Acid Cartel” hired an 
accounting firm to monitor the sales reports of individual cartel members (Connor 2001; Harrington Jr. 
and Skrzypacz 2007).  Executives at the meeting of the “Lysine Cartel” complained that prices were too 
low, suspecting co-conspirator Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) of cheating.  ADM, which was indeed 
cheating, countered the allegations by suggesting that “one can point a lot of fingers” and that “the best 
thing to do was to find a solution to a problem” (Cabral 2005, 201).  Financial statements reduce mistrust 
because they are audited and presented in a standardized form, making them helpful for international 
cartels that use comparable figures for their monitoring activities.  
Importantly, using publicly available financial statements for monitoring, rather than exchanging 
private information during meetings, reduces the costs of prosecution.  The key issue in prosecuting 
cartels is finding evidence that a conspiracy has taken place, evidence that can be gathered during 
unannounced searches of business premises or from cartel members willing to participate in the leniency 
program (Brenner 2009).  Any private information (prepared by one cartel member) found in the 
possession of another cartel member can be used in court as evidence of conspiracy.4  Conversely, cartels 
that coordinate their actions based on publicly available information can escape prosecution.  For 
example, the German Cartel Office found that price changes at major fuel retail firms showed evidence 
that the firms had coordinated their fuel prices.  Yet the authorities could not prove any wrongdoing 
because the coordination mechanism apparently relied only on publicly available information 
(Bundeskartellamt 2011).5 
While the availability of financial information can enable cartel formation, cartel sustainability 
depends on whether transparent reporting reduces contracting costs or destabilizes the cartel by revealing 
                                                 
4 The U.S. Department of Justice finds that cartel members routinely give each other “explicit instructions to destroy any 
evidence of the conspiracy” (Griffin 2000). 
5 The EU General Court concluded “…That if the information is in the public domain as a result of mandatory disclosure 
requirements (in that case compulsory publication under U.S. law) or if it can be easily deduced from publicly available 
information, the exchange of this information between competitors cannot be considered an infringement of the EU Treaty 




cheating.  Thus the ex post effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration remains an empirical 
question.   
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The accounting literature examines whether a given level of industry competition affects financial 
disclosures and reporting transparency (see Healy and Palepu, 2001, and Verrecchia, 2001, for a review).  
It predicts that a firm’s competitors can strategically use its financial disclosure.  Because firms fear that 
increased transparency can erode their market position, they adjust the transparency of reported 
information. This adjustment depends on the nature of the competition (Beyer et al. 2010).  For example, 
when analyzing voluntary disclosure of industry-wide news, Rogers at al. (2014) find that strategic non-
disclosure is more likely in industries with greater negative tail risk, greater equity incentives, and 
industry associations that foster interpersonal connections.  Bertomeu et al. (2015) both predict and find 
that disclosure of production forecasts is more valuable within a tacit agreement, because a tacit 
agreement reduces the proprietary costs of disclosure.  We examine whether the reverse effect is possible, 
that is, whether the use of transparent financial statements in collusive agreements affects industry 
competition.   
Coordination among cartel members can sustain itself as long as the expected benefits of long-term 
collusion exceed the short-term private returns from defection (Dick 1996; Pepall et al. 2005).  Thus, 
cartel members seek reliable information for monitoring and policing the cartel agreement (Telser 1980; 
Williamson 1974), and invest in information gathering to improve their monitoring of individual firms’ 
activities (Levenstein and Suslow 2006).  Transparent reporting can reduce contracting costs, which arise 
through uncertainty and information asymmetry among its members (Williamson 1973; Stigler 1964).  As 
the credibility of information is a critical determinant of cartel duration (Spar 1994), audited financial 
statements constitute an incremental monitoring device that can reduce contracting costs by providing 
transparent, publicly observable, and verifiable information (Ball et al. 2008; Watts and Zimmerman 




Because accounting information is used for facilitating the cartel agreement, the transparency of this 
information likely has implications for the sustainability of the cartel agreement.  For enforceable 
product-licensing agreements that rely on disaggregate accounting sales data, Kim-Gina (2018) finds that 
the quality of sales data determines the scope of auditing and penalties for adverse audit outcomes.  We 
argue that transparent accounting standards (IFRS and U.S. GAAP) can help sustain a cartel by requiring 
greater disclosure than local GAAP (Daske and Gebhardt 2006).  Importantly, transparent accounting 
standards require business-segment and geographic disclosures, both of which reveal detailed information 
on sales and market shares for monitoring purposes.  Furthermore, transparent accounting standards 
facilitate the comparison of sales and performance figures across countries (Brochet et al. 2013).  For 
example, by unifying revenue recognition criteria, they assist cartels with allocating production and 
territories, effectively responding to the threats of new entrants, and monitoring market shares.  Moreover, 
transparent accounting standards lower earnings management (Barth et al. 2013; Barth et al. 2008).  
Because earnings management is a common practice among cartels (González et al. 2015), transparent 
reporting can increase the reliability of information for monitoring purposes but also decrease verification 
costs.  Thus, by decreasing contracting costs, transparent accounting standards may increase the 
sustainability of cartels.   
However, transparent accounting standards may decrease cartel duration if cartel firms cheat and 
reporting transparency helps detect cheating.  Unlike debt or compensation contracts, the cartel contract 
has no legal standing and is formed by industry peers.  Non-cooperation and cheating at the expense of 
one’s rivals is a short-term dominant strategy among cartel members because, in the short term, the 
cheating returns to an individual firm may exceed the collective returns of sustaining collusion (Pepall et 
al. 2005; Roberts 1985).  In other words, a strong temptation exists for cartel members to extract one-time 
gains by undercutting the agreed-upon cartel price (Suslow 2005).  Furthermore, because cartels are 
illegal and non-enforceable, cartel members lack an effective mechanism for controlling cheating (Orr 
and MacAvoy 1965).  Thus transparent reporting can offer an effective means of discovering cheating 




figures.  Therefore, when cartel members cheat, we expect reporting transparency to yield information 
about cheating, either by unravelling cheating within a transparent firm or by narrowing the circle of 
suspect firms by excluding complying firms with transparent reporting. 
Once cheating is discovered, cartel members face two immediate choices.  First, they may choose to 
invest in costly mechanisms that deter future cheating (Sannikov and Skrzypacz 2007).  For example, 
despite continuously gathering private information on market shares, the Joint Executive Committee 
Railroad Cartel did not prevent its members from cheating (Ulen 1980; Porter 1983).  The cartel had to 
implement a number of costly mechanisms to stabilize itself after the cheating was discovered (e.g., it 
hired “very handsomely paid” arbitrators).  In another example, the “Lysine Cartel” described earlier 
included ADM, which reported transparently under U.S. GAAP, and three other firms that used local 
GAAP.  The firm with transparent reporting was suspected of cheating.  This cartel’s solution was to 
implement certain mechanisms for deterring cheating.  Thus, the discovery of deviations from the cartel 
agreement raises the cost of deterrence (Abreu et al. 1991).6  The literature predicts that cartels will 
dissolve if those costs become too high (e.g., Stigler 1964; Dick 1996).   
Second, the non-cheating cartel members can also choose either to cheat, leading to a price war, or to 
terminate the cartel in anticipation of one.  Levenstein (1997) reports that publicly announced violations 
of collusive agreements frequently lead to price wars that have ended cartels.  Harrington and Skrzypacz’s 
(2011) model shows that cartels are stable as long as they truthfully report sales information.  For 
example, after Uralkali obtained information that its partner was selling outside of the partnership, its 
CEO announced his firm’s decision to terminate an informal global-pricing cartel that had existed for 
eight years and controlled up to 43 percent of the world potash market (Alpert and MacDonald 2013).  
We posit that financial reporting transparency may lower cartel duration because it increases the 
likelihood of detecting cheaters through better means of verifying self-reported numbers, leading to either 
                                                 
6 How transparent reporting affects the cheating rates remains unclear.  One argument predicts that firms will be less likely 
to cheat if they anticipate that cheating is more likely to be discovered.  However, Abreu et al. (1991) show that more 
transparent and frequent reporting increases the number of ways in which firms can cheat and provides incentives for them 





an increase in deterrence costs or a costly price war.  We formulate our hypothesis in non-directional form 
as follows: 
H1:  The transparency of financial reporting information affects cartel duration. 
 
Because we predict that transparent accounting standards increase the likelihood of detecting 
cheaters, the average outcome predicted by hypothesis 1 depends on the base rate of cheating in the 
population.  While all cartels have a tendency to cheat, some cartels are sustainable over longer periods 
while others dissolve quickly which suggests that the propensity to cheat and the response to cheating are 
not uniform across cartels.  The economic literature offers several explanations for differences in the 
extent of cheating and its effect on cartel sustainability.  First, cartels implement organizational structures 
that help them reduce cheating and stabilize the cartel when cheating is revealed (Stigler 1964).  Trade 
associations can stabilize cartels by stipulating cartel practices, by enforcing the cartel agreement, and by 
facilitating communication to resolve any disputes (Stigler 1964; Harrington Jr. and Skrzypacz 2011).  
For example, Genesove and Mullin (2001) review the case of the Sugar Institute, a trade association that 
enforced the cartel agreement and “sought [customers’] adherence to the agreement through blacklisting 
deviators…, and instilling a culture of adherence to the codes” (p. 393).  When cheating by cartel 
members did occur, the trade association had measures in place to stabilize the cartel by either matching 
or ignoring any member’s deviation.   
Levenstein and Suslow (2011) provide empirical support for the role of trade associations in policing 
the cartel agreement and show that the involvement of a trade association significantly decreases the 
likelihood of a cartel break-up.  If a trade association is effective in eliminating cheating or coordination 
of the cartel response to cheating, we predict that financial reporting transparency provides contracting 
benefits and increases cartel duration.  However, when a cartel lacks an effective policing mechanism of a 
trade association, cheating is relatively more likely and financial reporting transparency is expected to 
reduce cartel duration through earlier discovery of cheating.  
Second, economic theory predicts that excess capacity reduces the likelihood of cheating.  When 




cartel members.  The imposed retaliation on a cartel member is determined by the total excess capacity 
available to the cartel members (Osborne and Pitchik 1987).  Reviewing recent cartel cases in the U.S., 
Kolasky (2002) concludes that excess capacity is effective in punishing cheating and enforcing the cartel 
agreement.  Rosenbaum (1989) argues that inventory holdings can act as excess capacity, facilitating 
retaliation by selling goods available for sale at a discounted price.  We predict that financial reporting 
transparency increases (decreases) cartel duration when the cartel members possess high (low) excess 
capacity. 
Third, Tirole (1988) argues that differences in the cartel members’ cost structures provide incentives 
for cheating.  Some firms have lower costs and earn higher profits than others due to operating 
efficiencies or different cost structures.  These firms have the strongest incentive to cheat, because they 
can afford a larger price cut while remaining profitable and can gain a larger market share by defecting 
(Tirole 1988; Caudill and Mixon 1994).  We expect that the profit heterogeneity within the cartel provides 
incentives for cheating and that financial reporting transparency will increase (decrease) cartel duration 
when cartel members have similar (dissimilar) profitability levels.  Using cartel organizational structure, 
excess capacity, and profit heterogeneity to capture differences in the likelihood of cheating, we formally 
state our predictions as follows: 
H1a: Financial reporting transparency decreases cartel duration when firms cheat and more so if cheating 
is widespread.  When cheating is not expected, financial reporting transparency increases cartel 
duration by reducing contracting costs.  
 
Next, we provide insights into the attributes of transparent accounting standards that affect cartel 
duration.  Information on sales is fundamental to facilitating and monitoring the cartel agreement, because 
cartels agree on shares of product and geographical markets.  Segment reporting enables the validation of 
self-reported sales numbers through the breakdown of sales for different markets.  While transparent 
accounting standards such as IFRS (IFRS 8, previously IAS 14) and U.S. GAAP (SFAS 131, previously 
SFAS 14) require firms to disclose sales at the business-segment level, local GAAP rarely mandated such 
disclosures.  The literature on segment reporting shows that segment information helps investors monitor 




validation mechanism for self-reported sales figures, segment disclosure provides a finer description of 
operations and reduces contracting costs.   
Alternatively, segment sales data can lead to earlier cheating discovery, which imposes costly 
deterrence mechanisms or leads to price wars.  Gonzáles et al. (2015) provide evidence supporting the 
importance of segment information for uncovering cheating, by showing that some cartels change 
segment classifications to disguise their actions.7  This line of argument predicts a negative relationship 
between the requirement of reporting segment information and cartel duration. 
H2:  Transparent segment reporting affects cartel duration. 
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION 
Our sample consists of all listed firms that violated Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the EU and that the EC convicted between 1980 and 2010 for forming a horizontal or vertical agreement 
on price fixing, production quotas, or market shares.  We focus on the sample of cartels indicted by the 
EC to keep the enforcement regime constant while still achieving a high degree of variation in the 
reporting transparency of the sample firms.  This variation stems from variation in national accounting 
laws in the EU before IFRS adoption and the power of the EC to indict all firms that disrupt trade 
between EU member states, regardless of their country of origin.  As the information on cartel cases is 
disclosed only when the investigation is completed, the dates over which the cartels operated range 
between 1980 and 2005.  To test our hypotheses, we use (1) Reports on Competition Policy (hereafter, 
Reports) and the EC website for data on the cartels, their structure, and their duration; (2) Worldscope for 
accounting data of publicly quoted cartel members; and (3) hand-collected data on segments from public 
firm financial statements.  
We conduct our analysis at two levels of data aggregation.  First, we use disaggregated data, with 
each data point identifying a public firm in a given cartel at a given time (i.e., our unit of analysis is the 
cartel firm year).  To construct a broad set of financial statement variables and to better identify the 
hypothesized relationships, we use information on public firms with available financial data.  Moreover, 
                                                 
7 Overall, they do not find that cartel firms report fewer segments than a matched sample of non-cartel firms (see Gonzáles 




we treat public firms as the “ringleaders” because they are larger than private firms and thus enjoy larger 
market share allocations in cartels and have a greater influence on cartel behavior (Levenstein and Suslow 
2011).  Second, we aggregate information at the cartel level.  While changing the unit of analysis to a 
cartel decreases the number of observations, it allows us to better align our tests with the hypothesized 
cartel duration.  Furthermore, the aggregated analysis enables us to include all cartels convicted by the 
EC, including those either with or consisting solely of private firms.  Although European private and 
public firms face similar reporting and disclosure requirements, financial accounting databases have 
sparse coverage of private firms until the late 1990s.8  Consequently, our tests using private firms rely on 
data from the Reports rather than data from private firm financial statements.   
In total, we have information on 98 cartels consisting of public and private firms.  These cartels 
include 131 public firms with accounting data available on Worldscope, corresponding to 186 cartel firm 
observations, because some firms participated in more than one cartel during our sample period.  The total 
number of observations in our analysis using disaggregated public firm data is 1,072 cartel firm years 
(corresponding to 60 unique cartels).  Our additional tests at the cartel year and cartel level use 391 and 
98 data points, respectively.9  Table 1 presents the distribution across countries of the sample used in our 
disaggregated analysis, and the number of firm-years in which cartel members followed transparent 
accounting standards.  
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the experimental and control variables used in our tests.  The 
average cartel duration is 10.68 years, which is close to the average of 10.84 years reported in De (2010).  
The mean cartel fine levied by the EC is €63.41 million.  The average (median) cartel has 18.11 (13) 
member firms, and 37 percent of the firm years report under IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  
– Insert Table 2 about here – 
                                                 
8 EU accounting regulation is based on each firm’s legal form, not on its listing status (Burgstahler et al. 2006). 
9 If a cartel has three listed and four non-listed members and lasts for 10 years, we use 30 data points in the cartel firm-





V. MAIN RESULTS 
Test of Hypothesis 1: Effect of Reporting Transparency on Cartel Duration 
We use cartel duration as our proxy for the success of the collusion.  As lifetime data often violates 
the normality distribution, we investigate the determinants of cartel duration using the survival analysis 
technique and the Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972).  This method is commonly applied in 
duration analysis because it does not assume any underlying distribution (Levenstein and Suslow 2011; 
Cleves et al. 2008).  We tabulate the estimated hazard coefficients, which indicate the probability of exit 
from a state in the next period, given survival up to that time.  Thus a positive coefficient implies a 
reduction in cartel duration.  We base our inferences on standard errors clustered at the cartel-firm level.  
In our tests using disaggregated public firm data, the hazard function for firm i is given by 
ℎ(𝑡𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)exp (𝛽𝛽1𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 
+𝛽𝛽5#𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅_𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓)      (1) 
where h0(t) denotes the baseline hazard function and t is the elapsed time since the firm first joined the 
cartel.  Using cartel duration as the dependent variable has a methodological advantage.  Because cartels 
are illegal, we can observe data only for indicted cartels.  The use of indicted cartels in our analysis can 
lead to a selection bias if the characteristics affecting the start of an investigation are correlated with 
reporting transparency and cartel duration.10  Because the selection bias affects every study on 
competition policy, Harrington Jr. and Chang (2009) develop a model for endogenizing the population of 
undiscovered and discovered cartels and then identifying how these two populations are related.  Their 
findings suggest that the analysis of indicted cartels is generally not prone to a selection bias when cartel 
duration is used as the dependent variable (Harrington Jr. and Chang 2009; Harrington Jr. and Wei 2017).  
Nevertheless our additional tests control for the selection bias due to the involvement of the regulator.  
                                                 
10 The vast majority of the EC cartel investigations are triggered by the use of the leniency program and complaints from 
affected parties, rather than some form of active market screening or analysis of publicly available information (Parliament 
2009):  Over 2005-2010, the EC estimates that 73 percent of its cartel investigations were initiated after it received 
incriminating information from one of the cartel members (in exchange for a fine reduction), 15 percent of its 
investigations were initiated after it received complaints from consumers or information from the informants, and 4 
percent were based on tip-offs from local cartel authorities and other institutions (based mostly on complaints received by 
those institutions).  Only 6 percent of EC cartel cases were initiated as a result of an in-depth market analysis or sector 




Evidence shows that internationally recognized accounting standards increase transparency by 
requiring the provision of comparable information and by mandating more informative disclosure, most 
notably on business segments (Daske et al. 2013; Lang et al. 2012; Byard et al. 2011).  We use an 
indicator variable FRT that equals 1 if the company follows transparent accounting standards (IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP), based on Worldscope and Daske et al. (2013), in a given year.  The first year of IFRS 
adoption in our sample varies between 1987 and 2005.  The coefficient β1 tests hypothesis 1 and is 
predicted to be negative if reporting transparency leads to greater cartel sustainability by reducing 
contracting costs.  Alternatively, β1 will be positive if reporting transparency reveals cheating and 
destabilizes a cartel.  
We use a set of control variables predicted to affect cartel duration.  First, changes in the antitrust 
policy and enforcement affect cartel stability.  To control for changes in the EU’s antitrust policy, we 
focus on the application of the leniency program, which guarantees a reduction in the fine associated with 
an infringement and provides firms with incentives for reporting their own antitrust violations to cartel 
authorities (Brenner 2009).  Prior literature suggests that the implementation and enforcement of laws 
ensure their effectiveness, rather than their mere existence (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002).  Therefore, 
we examine the application of leniency policy on cartel duration, and use an indicator variable 
LENIENCY that equals 1 for listed cartel firms that participated in the leniency program and 0 otherwise 
as our ex post measure of enforcement effectiveness.11  Harrington Jr. and Chang (2009) predict that if the 
leniency policy is effective, the duration of the detected cartels should increase, because marginally stable 
cartels will break down or eventually not form in the first place, whereas only stable cartels will survive.  
Furthermore, we use fines in percentage of total assets (FINE) to control for changes in the enforcement 
of antitrust policies.  Higher fines can be the result of stricter enforcement, which destabilizes cartels, or 
they can sustain cartels by increasing the costs of breaking them up (Connor 2004). 
                                                 
11 Our results are robust to alternative specifications of this variable.  First, the EC introduced the leniency program in 
1996, leading to an increase in cartel detection rates over time (European Commission 2005).  We controlled for this effect 
using year fixed effects in columns (2-4) of Table 3 and a time trend variable (untabulated results).  Second, we redefined 
LENIENCY as the percentage of cartel members that participated in the leniency program (see Table 4).  Third, using data 
from Dong et al. (2014), we controlled for the existence of leniency provisions in the national competition laws of 




Second, we control for the cartel’s organizational structure.  Repeat offenders can help set up 
effective coordination mechanisms because they have previously formed cartels; however, they likely 
experience higher scrutiny from external parties (De 2010).  We use an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a cartel member is a repeat offender and 0 otherwise (REPEAT).  We also control for the total number of 
members in a given cartel (#MEMBER).  While theory predicts that cartel duration should decrease with 
the number of cartel members, empirical evidence is ambiguous (Stigler 1964; Posner 1970).  Third, we 
use the log of total assets SIZE as a proxy for firm size.  Larger firms face higher reputational losses due 
to cartel detection and have greater incentives to monitor cartel activities.  Fourth, cartel stability may 
decrease because cartel members may not be able to differentiate exogenous macroeconomic shocks from 
actual cheating behavior (Green and Porter 1984; Suslow 2005).  To control for macroeconomic shocks, 
we use GDP growth data from the World Bank.   
To examine whether reporting transparency affects cartel duration, we first conduct a univariate test 
and compare the mean cartel duration of firms with different levels of financial reporting transparency.  
We find that the mean duration for firms that report transparently (9.48 years) is significantly lower than 
that of opaque reporters (11.37 years; t-stat. 5.43).  This result supports hypothesis 1 and suggests that 
reporting transparency decreases cartel duration through earlier detection of cheating. 
Table 3, column (1) reports the results of eqn. (1).  We find a positive and significant coefficient of 
our proxy for financial reporting transparency (coeff. 0.666; z-stat. 2.04).  This finding confirms that 
higher reporting transparency reveals cartel member cheating, which destabilizes cartels.  To assess the 
economic significance of our results, Figure 1 plots the Kaplan-Meier failure function, showing the 
probability to failure over time.  The failure functions are based on the Cox regressions estimated for high 
and low reporting transparency groups.  Furthermore, we standardize values of the covariates reported in 
column (1) of Table 3 to assess the difference in failure rates between the reporting transparency groups 
for an average cartel firm.  Figure 1 shows that cartels with high reporting transparency are generally 
more likely to fail in the next year than those with low reporting transparency.  Furthermore, the 




low-transparency cartels ranges between 11 percentage points when the cartel duration is 6 years (lower 
quartile of duration) and 26 percentage points when the cartel duration is 14 years (upper quartile of 
duration).   
– Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 about here – 
For our control variables, we find a negative coefficient on LENIENCY (coeff. –1.101, z-stat. 2.82), 
supporting the prediction that the use of the leniency policy by cartel members increases cartel duration.  
Furthermore, levied fines prolong the lives of cartels by increasing the costs of breaking them up (coeff. –
0.189, z-stat. 2.09).  While the coefficients on the other control variables have the predicted signs, they 
are not significant at the conventional level in all of the specifications. 
To alleviate concerns that our results are driven by time-invariant characteristics, we control in 
column (2) for country, industry (based on the Fama-French 10-industry classification), and year fixed 
effects.12  We still find a positive coefficient on FRT in support of our prior findings.  Next, to assess 
whether unobserved firm heterogeneity affects our results, we use an OLS model with firm fixed 
effects.13  Untabulated results reveal that cartel time span is 21 percent lower for firms that report 
transparently than for opaque reporters (t-stat. 1.71).  
Next, we subject our tests to some alternative explanations and augment eqn. (1) with a set of 
additional control variables.  Because the number of observations varies depending on the additional data 
requirements, we report results after including these control variables one at a time.  First, both industry 
dynamics and the presence of new entrants affect the competitive environment and influence cartel 
sustainability (Lipczynski et al. 2005; Tirole 1988).  For example, a low number of industry peers makes 
monitoring and initializing collusion easier.  In turn, if a cartel cannot prevent new firms from entering 
the industry or cannot force them to join the cartel, new entrants will increase the industry output, sell at a 
price below that set by the cartel, and win the market share of the cartel firms, eventually leading to the 
                                                 
12 Including country fixed effects does not allow us to identify the effects of countries with a small number of data points.  
Therefore, we replicated our results using countries with at least 20 data points.  We also replicated the results using more 
granular industry classifications according to the 12-, 17-, 30-, 38-, 48-, and 49-industry groupings in Fama and French 
(1997).  These additional tests did not change the inferences of our analysis.  
13 The Cox firm fixed effects model did not achieve convergence because of collinearity.  However, we were able to 
estimate the Cox random effects model, an alternative way of controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity.  The 




cartel’s breakdown.  We capture industry dynamics and the presence of new entrants using the percentage 
change in aggregate industry sales based on the Worldscope sample of public firms from the 25 sample 
countries (ΔIND_SALES).14   
Second, the international expansion of cartel firms reduces group homogeneity within the cartel, 
thereby destabilizing it (Pindyck 1977).  Additionally, international expansion is correlated with 
following internationally recognized accounting standards.  We use firm-level changes in the percentage 
of foreign sales (ΔFOREIGN_SALES%) to control for international expansion.15  Third, we employ 
controls for the local antitrust enforcement and use the cartel member’s country’s annual cartel detection 
rate (LOCAL_ENF), based on Connor (2014).  Fourth, the results in González et al. (2015) show that 
governance mechanisms affect price fixing.  We control for cross-country variation in investor protection 
and classify countries into high- versus low-investor protection regimes, using the median split of the 
anti-director-rights index (La Porta et al. 1998).  This analysis omits 14 cartel firm years due to the 
unavailability of the anti-director-rights index for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Luxembourg. 
The results of columns (3) to (6) of Table 3 show that industry dynamics, international expansion, 
and high governance standards destabilize cartels.  Importantly, controlling for observable factors that 
affect cartel duration and may correlate with reporting transparency does not affect our inferences.  
We find a negative association between reporting transparency and cartel duration using data of 
publicly quoted cartel members.  To replicate our analysis at the cartel level, we use eqn. (1) and define 
variables at the cartel level by calculating their average values for each cartel or cartel year.16  Table 4 
panel A, uses 391 data points and reports the results of the cartel-year analysis. We are interested in the 
coefficient on FRT_CARTEL, the percentage of cartel members that report under IFRS or U.S. GAAP in a 
given year.  We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient (coeff. 2.458, z-stat. 1.85), which is 
                                                 
14 Our results are qualitatively similar when we proxy for industry dynamics using (the change in) the number of industry 
peers, industry growth opportunities (the change in the industry book-to-market ratio), and entry barriers (the industry 
ratio of fixed assets to total assets).   
15 Using anticipated international expansion (future foreign sales) in an untabulated sensitivity analysis does not change 
our inferences. 
16 Because we do not have data on the total assets of private firms, our cartel-level analysis either excludes or redefines 
variables that use total assets.  We also have no data on the accounting frameworks of private firms.  However, because 
none of the EU countries allowed the voluntary adoption of IFRS for the individual accounts of private firms during our 




robust to inclusion of industry fixed effects (coeff. 3.259, z-stat. 1.83).  This result confirms both our prior 
results and hypothesis 1.   
– Insert Table 4 about here – 
We now, turn to the cartel-level data (N = 98) and estimate the model using the simplest form of the 
Cox proportional hazard model, where the dependent variable is cartel duration, and the independent 
variables are time-invariant cartel characteristics (see Cleves et al. 2008).  We exploit cross-sectional 
differences in the transparency of local GAAP relative to U.S. GAAP and IFRS.  Redefining our test 
variable in such a way allows for a more granular measurement of reporting transparency. 
We consider 17 reporting and disclosure requirements from Bae et al. (2008), which are treated 
similarly under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  We then determine whether local GAAP mandates rules different 
from those under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.  These differences stem from greater disclosure requirements 
under IFRS and U.S. GAAP and from the existence of local GAAP measurement rules that can lead to 
opaque financial statements and offer potential for earnings management.  We define GAAP_DIFF as the 
negative average distance (i.e., number of differences) of cartel members’ local GAAP from IFRS and 
U.S. GAAP, based on the country scores from Bae et al. (2008).  Values of this variable close to zero 
indicate that cartel members are on average required to use transparent accounting rules (i.e., rules similar 
to those of U.S. GAAP and IFRS).  Table 4, panel B, reports a positive and significant coefficient on 
GAAP_DIFF (coeff. 0.073, z-stat. 2.30), suggesting that reporting transparency lowers cartel duration.   
Test of Hypothesis 1a: Transparency, Cheating, and Cartel Duration 
Our previous results show that reporting transparency is associated with lower cartel duration, 
consistent with the role of transparency in cheating discovery.  We next provide direct evidence on the 
role of cheating in mediating the relationship between transparency and cartel duration.  Hypothesis 1a 
predicts that financial reporting transparency decreases cartel duration when cheating occurs and more so 
when cheating is widespread, while transparency increases cartel duration when cartel firms do not cheat.  




agreement or coordinate the cartel’s response to cheating, (b) have low excess capacity, and (c) have high 
profit heterogeneity.   
To test hypothesis 1a, we augment eqn. (1) with a new variable that proxies for the likelihood of 
cheating (CHEAT), and an interaction between this new variable and FRT.  (While we report results for 
the parsimonious model, our inferences do not change when we control for other determinants of cartel 
duration from Table 3.)  In this set-up, the coefficient on FRT measures the association between reporting 
transparency and cartel duration when cheating is relatively unlikely (i.e., CHEAT = 0).  Because we 
expect transparency to lead to contracting benefits when cheating is unlikely, we predict the FRT 
coefficient to be negative.  The coefficient of the interaction term FRT×CHEAT shows the incremental 
effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration for cartels that are more likely to incur cheating.  
Because transparent reporting decreases cartel duration when cheating occurs, and more so when cheating 
is widespread, we predict a positive coefficient on FRT×CHEAT.  We do not predict how cheating affects 
cartel duration when cheating cannot be uncovered due to opaque reporting (i.e. coefficient on CHEAT).  
However, our three cheating proxies are negatively correlated with cartel duration (average ρ –0.102 and 
t-stat. 3.25), indicating that overall cheating (i.e. for cartels with high and low financial reporting 
transparency) destabilizes cartels.   
We obtain information from the Reports on the use of a trade association, finding that 22 percent of 
the cartels use one.  The variable CHEAT equals 1 if the cartel does not use a trade association, and 0 
otherwise.  Table 5, column (1) shows that the reduction in cartel duration for transparent cartels is more 
pronounced when the likelihood of cheating is high than when it is low (coeff. 1.980, z-stat. 1.91).  While 
transparent reporting decreases cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating is high (coeff. –0.313 + 
1.980 = 1.667), we find that transparent reporting is associated with an increase in cartel duration when 
cartels use a trade association to counteract cheating (coeff. –0.313).  Although the increase in cartel 
duration for cartels that use a trade association is not significant at the conventional level, the sign of the 
coefficient suggests that reporting transparency may provide contracting benefits in the cartel setting 




– Insert Table 5 about here – 
We next use two continuous variables to proxy for the extent of cheating.  First, because cartel 
members can invest in excess capacity to retaliate when another cartel member cheats, column (2) 
investigates abnormal increases in inventory.  We now define CHEAT as the average change in inventory 
holdings (scaled by total assets) of cartel members less the average change in inventory holdings (scaled 
by total assets) of firms outside of the cartel, matched by industry, country, and year.  While taking the 
first difference in inventory holdings controls for firm-specific inventory levels, subtracting industry-wide 
changes controls for inventory changes over the business cycle.  We multiply the variable by –1, so that 
higher values of the variable (lower excess capacity) increase cheating rates.  Second, column (3) reports 
the results for cartels with heterogeneous profitability, because differences in profitability levels within 
the cartel provide incentives for cheating.  We redefine CHEAT in column (3) as the standard deviation of 
EBIT over total assets for each cartel and year.17   
We find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term FRT×CHEAT (column 2: coeff. 
0.343, z-stat. 2.03; column 3: coeff. 0.497, z-stat. 2.06):  Transparent reporting is associated with a greater 
decrease in cartel duration when the likelihood of cheating increases.  These results support hypothesis 1a 
and suggest that transparent reporting reduces cartel duration by revealing cheating.   
The coefficients on FRT in columns (2) and (3) capture the effect of reporting transparency on cartel 
duration when the cheating proxy equals zero.  At this level, the coefficient on FRT in column (3) is 
predictably negative, albeit not significant (coeff. –0.601, z-stat. 0.50), while it is positive and significant 
in column (2) (coeff. 1.553, z-stat. 2.53).  Although this positive coefficient is not consistent with our 
predictions, it is likely attributable to the effect of FRT being measured at zero, which—in case of excess 
capacity—represents the median value of this variable (see Table 2).  In turn, column (1) measures the 
effect of FRT for those 22% of cartels that are relatively unlikely to cheat (i.e. cartels with a trade 
association), while column (3) measures the effect of FRT for the minimum value of the cheating proxy 
(i.e., standard deviation of profits is zero).  To the extent that cheating is still prevalent for the median 
                                                 




cartel in our sample, the resulting decrease in cartel duration may overshadow any contracting benefits of 
transparent reporting and explain why we find a positive coefficient on FRT in column (2). 
As with our tests in the previous section, we validate results of our cross-sectional tests by using the 
cartel year as the unit of analysis.  To increase the power of our tests, we construct a summary measure of 
propensity to cheat based on our three cheating proxies.  CHEAT now equals 1 if a cartel does not use a 
trade association and has low excess capacity and has heterogeneous cost structures in a given year.  
CHEAT equals 0 for all other cartel years.  To ensure that we have a sufficient number of observations in 
each category, we assign our two continuous variables into tertiles and use observations from the second 
and the third tertiles to identify cartels with the relatively high likelihood of cheating.18  Then we augment 
the cartel-year analysis from Table 4, panel A, by including FRT×CHEAT, where FRT is the percent of 
cartel members that report under IFRS or U.S. GAAP.  Different from Table 4, we use only public cartel 
firms for which we have data on all three cheating proxies.  We find that the coefficient on the interaction 
term FRT×CHEAT remains positive and significant (coeff. 8.967, z-stat. 2.07), while that on FRT is not 
significant at the conventional level. 
Overall, our findings suggest that reporting transparency influences the outcomes of non-enforceable 
cartel agreements by allowing the cartel members to more effectively monitor the adherence to the 
agreement.  However, our results do not rule out the role of reporting transparency in facilitating 
contracting, as any contracting benefits of reporting transparency in our sample may be overshadowed by 
cheating. 
Test of Hypothesis 2: Segment Reporting and Cartel Duration 
We next examine the attributes of transparent accounting standards that can affect cartel duration.  
Both to verify self-reported sales figures and to detect cheating, cartels require segment sales data.  We 
expect that IFRS and U.S. GAAP firms will report segment data more transparently than local GAAP, 
due to differences in segment disclosure requirements between IFRS or U.S. GAAP and local GAAP.  
                                                 
18 As a result, we code 63 percent of observations as cartels with relatively high likelihood of cheating (CHEAT = 1), and 
37 percent of observations as cartels with relatively low likelihood of cheating (CHEAT = 0).  This split is consistent with 





Furthermore, in line with our previous results, we expect cartels with more transparent segment disclosure 
to have lower durations.  
To analyze whether IFRS and U.S. GAAP require greater segment disclosure than local GAAP, we 
use the number of reported segments from Worldscope as a proxy for segment reporting transparency 
(Cho 2015).  Table 6 panel A, compares the mean number of reported business segments of firms that 
follow transparent accounting standards to that of firms reporting under local GAAP.  We conduct this 
test for three different sub-samples: (1) the full sample, (2) the sample of IFRS vs. local GAAP firms, and 
(3) a sample of firms that switch from local GAAP to IFRS.  This third test controls for cross-sectional 
heterogeneity in segment reporting practices and uses each firm as its own control.  In all three cases, we 
find that IFRS and U.S. GAAP increase the number of reported business segments relative to local 
GAAP, possibly explaining why we find lower cartel durations for firms following transparent accounting 
standards. 
To show that segment disclosures affect cartel duration, we use eqn. (1) after substituting the proxy 
for segment transparency SEGTRANS for FRT.  We define SEGTRANS as the average segment number 
reported by all cartel members in a given year.19  Table 6 panel B, reports the results of this analysis.  We 
find a negative association between the number of segments and cartel duration (coeff. 0.298; z-stat. 
2.32).  This result is consistent with segment disclosures that allow cartel members to detect cheating by 
either providing enough information to infer cartel-market sales or directly reporting cartel-market sales. 
– Insert Table 6 about here – 
González et al. (2013) find that cartel firms use their discretion in the classification of business 
segments and frequently reclassify segments to misguide readers of financial statements.  For example, 
they report on the case of a cartel member Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., which constantly reorganized 
business segments into different subcategories before eliminating such disclosures for a number of years.  
Because firms can use segment reclassifications to hide cheating, we use segment reclassifications as our 
                                                 
19 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we use the log of the segment number reported by firm i in year t as our 
firm-specific measure of segment transparency.  Furthermore, the results hold when we use a proxy based on hand-




measure of reporting opacity and hand-collect information from annual reports on segment reporting 
practices.   
Our data collection reveals that cartel firms frequently provide a two-layered disclosure of business 
segments: broadly defined business segments (collected by Worldscope) and more narrowly defined ones.  
More narrow segment reporting should provide a better means of verifying self-reported sales within a 
cartel.  Importantly, we observe that about a quarter of sampled firms disclose sales data for their share of 
the cartel market as one of their narrowly defined business segments.  To examine how firms change the 
presentation of their business segments, we track the disclosures of narrowly defined business segments 
over time and code changes in the presentation of business segments.   
We code a change in the presentation format when a firm changes the categories of business 
segments while maintaining their total number.  For example, British Airways—a member of the 
“Airfreight” cartel—reclassified “Scheduled service passenger,” “Scheduled service freight and mail,” 
and “Non-scheduled services” into “Network airline business,” “Regional airline business,” and “Non-
airline business.”  Furthermore, the presentation format changes when a firm reorganizes its segments into 
a different number of subcategories.  For example, Danone—a member of a beer cartel—merged two 
segments, “Beer” and “Mineral Water,” into one segment, “Beverages.”  While using hand-collected data 
leads to a lower sample size because we are not able to retrieve financial statements for all firm-years, this 
analysis exploits the important aspect of reporting practice in the cartel setting and allows us to observe 
the actual reclassifications between the business segments. 
We find a 49 percent chance that at least one cartel firm reclassifies its business segments in a given 
year, thus reducing the overall transparency in the cartel.  Because constant reclassifications of business 
segments increase opacity, we redefine SEGTRANS as the average number of segment reclassifications 
for a given cartel over its lifespan and multiply it by –1, so that higher (lower) values of this variable 
indicate greater (lower) reporting transparency.  Table 6 panel B shows that cartels with a lower number 




2.74).  This result confirms our previous findings for the number of reported segments and supports 
hypothesis 2. 
To examine whether transparent accounting standards affect cartel duration by any means other than 
transparent segment disclosures, we augment the models estimated in Table 6 panel B, with FRT.  
Untabulated results show an incrementally positive and significant coefficient on FRT when we control 
for differences in segment disclosures.  This result suggests that transparent reporting standards may 
lower cartel duration because they can reveal cheating through the provision of comparable information 
and/or reduction in earnings management.  
Finally, we test hypothesis 2 using cartel-level data.  We use variation in the requirement for 
reporting business and geographic segments in the country in which the cartel firm is domiciled, based on 
data in Bae et al. (2008).  We define SEG_REQ as the percentage of cartel members based in countries 
requiring segment reporting under local GAAP.  This alternate proxy exploits the fact that the disclosure 
requirements are exogenous to the cartel firms, thereby alleviating the concern that cartel firms choose the 
reported number of business segments.  Furthermore, because our previous tests show that segment 
reclassifications play an important role in the cartel setting, we use cartel-level data to replicate previously 
reported results on segment reclassifications.  Table 6 panel C shows that cartels have lower duration both 
when cartel members face mandatory segment reporting requirements (coeff. 1.557, z-stat. 3.68) and 
when cartel members reclassify segments less frequently (coeff. 2.517; z-stat. 3.32).   
 
VI. SELECTION BIAS AND ENDOGENEITY ISSUES 
Selection Bias Due to Voluntary IFRS Adoption 
Our main finding that reporting transparency affects cartel duration may be due to an omitted 
variable bias, because we use a nonrandom sample of cartels and use firms that choose to report under 
IFRS.  In this section, we control for these selection biases.   
Our analysis includes firms that have a choice of voluntarily adopting IFRS.  As a result, we cannot 




of a cartel. We control for the endogeneity of IFRS adoption similarly to previous literature (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000; Müller et al. 2015).  We estimate a two-stage model, with the first stage estimating the 
likelihood of voluntary IFRS adoption based on firm-specific characteristics that affect firm decision to 
adopt IFRS, and the second stage using the estimates from the first-stage model to correct for the 
endogeneity of IFRS adoption.  Consistent with the literature that explains voluntary adoption of non-
local GAAP, we postulate that the decision to adopt IFRS is a function of financing needs (proxied by 
capital intensity), capital market pressure (proxied by disperse ownership structure), and firm size (log of 
total assets) (see Cuijpers and Buijink 2005; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000). 
The exclusion restriction of our two-stage model requires us to identify at least one independent 
variable that increases the likelihood of IFRS adoption, but that does not affect cartel duration in the 
second stage, except through its impact on IFRS adoption (Lennox et al. 2011).  Ownership dispersion 
plausibly satisfies the exclusion restriction, because dispersed ownership increases the demand for 
transparent accounting information under IFRS.  In untabulated tests, we find that ownership dispersion is 
positively correlated with the likelihood of IFRS adoption (p < 0.01).  At the same time, because 
“expendable” middle managers coordinate cartel operations and not the firm shareholders (Ashton and 
Pressey 2012), the ownership structure is less likely to directly affect cartel duration.  Because the 
effectiveness of our identification strategy depends on this conjuncture, we next report an alternative 
approach of dealing with the endogeneity of IFRS adoption, an approach that does not require us to use a 
two-stage model. 
Because endogeneity is a concern only for firms that can choose an accounting framework (as 
opposed to those required to follow local GAAP or U.S. GAAP), we endogenize the decision to report 
under IFRS or local GAAP in countries where voluntary IFRS adoption was common.  First, we identify 
three countries from Daske et al. (2013) where the choice to report under IFRS or local GAAP was 
common and at least 10 percent of firms listed in each country voluntarily adopted IFRS: Germany, 
Luxembourg, and Switzerland.  Second, we use all non-cartel firms from these three countries to examine 




This first-stage probit model estimates the weights that non-cartel firms assign to different observable 
determinants of IFRS adoption. Estimating the probit model out of sample allows us to rule out the 
possibility that cartel characteristics that lead to both IFRS adoption and cartel coordination could affect 
the model estimates (Christensen et al., 2007, use a similar approach). 
Third, we use the weights obtained from the probit model to estimate the probability of IFRS 
adoption for our sample of cartel firms choosing voluntary adoption.  Our use of predicted values from 
the first-stage probit regression is econometrically equivalent to augmenting the second-stage stage 
regression with the inverse Mills ratio (IMR).20  Using predicted values and out-of-sample estimates in 
our setting has an intuitive appeal:  We want to know whether a non-cartel firm, given specific 
characteristics, is likely to adopt IFRS.  We then “force” the cartel firm to make a similar decision to that 
of a firm that has similar characteristics but that does not need to consider any cartel-related costs of its 
decision to adopt IFRS.  The identification here is achieved through (a) the use of at least one firm 
characteristic (ownership dispersion) that is less likely to directly affect cartel duration and (b) the fact 
that the weights cartel firms assign to individual firm characteristics are unaffected by cartel 
considerations. 
We reestimate column (2) of Table 3 after substituting FRT_PROB for FRT.  FRT_PROB equals 1 
for firms that face a mandatory requirement to report under U.S. GAAP, a predicted out-of-sample 
probability of voluntary adoption for firms that had a choice between IFRS and local GAAP (probability 
values range between 0 and 1), and 0 for firms that report under local GAAP and cannot report under 
IFRS.21  Table 7, column (1), reports the results for the model that endogenizes the decision to follow 
IFRS.  After controlling for the endogenous nature of IFRS adoption, we find that transparent reporting 
reduces cartel duration (coeff. 1.797, z-stat. 2.23).  Because we next use U.S. firms in a separate analysis, 
                                                 
20 Maddala (1983) shows that both approaches are equivalent.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use predicted values from the 
first-stage probit model in the context of voluntary IFRS adoption and Müller et al. (2015) use predicted values to control 
for the endogeneity of the decision to recognize or disclose certain information.  We note that we obtain qualitatively 
similar results when we estimate the first-stage probit model within the sample of cartel firms and use the IMR in the 
second-stage model. 
21 Our sample includes eight firm-year observations from the mandatory IFRS adoption period (2005).  As all of these 
firms reported voluntarily under IFRS before the mandatory adoption period, each firm chose to adopt IFRS early.  





column (2) examines whether our results are solely attributable to U.S. firms.  We find qualitatively 
similar results after excluding U.S. firms from the sample (coeff. 1.915, z-stat. 1.81). 
– Insert Table 7 about here – 
As an alternative strategy to controlling for the endogeneity of IFRS adoption, column (3) shows that 
our results hold when the accounting framework is exogenously determined (i.e., for firms that cannot 
choose their accounting framework).  This analysis compares the cartel duration of firms required to 
follow U.S. GAAP to that of firms following local GAAP in countries with no choice of switching to 
IFRS.  We substitute USGAAP for FRT, and set USGAAP to 1 if a firm follows U.S. GAAP and to 0 if it 
follows local GAAP.  We find that transparent reporting under U.S. GAAP lowers cartel duration (coeff. 
21.589, z-stat. 6.83).22  While greater cartel enforcement in the U.S. may also lead to a positive 
coefficient on USGAAP, we obtain qualitatively similar results when we control for the effectiveness of 
cartel prosecution in different countries by using both the antitrust enforcement score, which captures 
managers’ views about the quality and the effectiveness of national antitrust regulations (see Global 
Competitiveness Reports, Schwab et al. 2007), and the number of prosecuted cartel cases in a given 
country and year  (Connor 2014).23   
Selection Bias Due to Sampling of Indicted Cartels  
The sample in our analysis is not random, because it omits firms that participated in the cartel but 
were not indicted for their anticompetitive behavior.  To control for the selection bias, we use the two-
stage Heckman estimation method.  In the first stage, we model the likelihood of being indicted by the 
                                                 
22 The estimated coefficient is substantially higher than the effect of FRT in Table 3, possibly indicating that the 
proportional hazards assumption was violated (Box-Steffensmeier and Christopher 2001) or that the model fails to account 
for the unobservable firm heterogeneity.  To control for misspecification of the hazard model and for the unobservables, 
we use an OLS model with firm random effects, which allows us to estimate the coefficient on the time invariant 
USGAAP.  We find that cartel duration decreases by 23 percent (p-value < 0.1) when a firm follows U.S. GAAP, a finding 
in line with our main results. 
23 The U.S. Department of Justice notes that cartels fear prosecution in the U.S. and therefore avoid involving U.S. 
subjects or meeting in the U.S.  For example, a non-U.S. member of the “Lysine Cartel” opposed holding its next cartel 
meeting in Hawaii because the U.S. “is very severe for the control of antitrust activity” (Griffin 2000).  These concerns 
were justified because the FBI videotaped the meeting, and these materials were later used as key pieces of evidence for 
prosecuting the cartel.  We note, however, that we examine cartels prosecuted by the EC, and thus U.S. enforcement can 
affect our results only if U.S. authorities start an independent investigation and tip off the EC about possible cartels.  EC 






EC, that is, the likelihood of being included in our main test sample.  Then, to control for the omitted 
variable problem, we include the estimate of the IMR (MILLS) as an additional explanatory variable in 
eqn. (1) (Heckman 1979). 
𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                     +𝛽𝛽4𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖               (2) 
Eqn. (2) is a probit regression that models the likelihood of being indicted by the EC.  The dependent 
variable (DETECT) equals 1 for all cartel firm years and 0 for the (non-cartel) control firms.  To 
approximate as closely as possible those firms that may have participated in unobservable cartels (i.e., 
cartels that did not break-up, that were not indicted, or both), we use control firms that are similar to our 
cartel firms in a number of important characteristics.  We match firms on country, industry, time period 
and size, resulting in 1,072 control firm year observations.  In the additional analysis, we more closely 
identify control firms that colluded but were not indicted or destabilized due to lax competition 
enforcement in their home country.  We do so by using the median antitrust enforcement score to further 
restrict the control sample to firms from countries with low antitrust enforcement.  
We use the minimum geographic distance between the cartel firms’ headquarters and the EC (DIST) 
to fulfill the exclusion restriction of our two-stage model, because the proximity of a firm to its regulator 
affects the effectiveness of regulation and the likelihood of cartel detection (DeFond et al. 2011) without 
having any direct effect on cartel duration.  For example, Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) find that regulation 
is most effective when it is local.  Table 8 shows that the proximity to the regulator increases the 
likelihood of indictment.  At the same time, that the distance from a certain geographic point can 
somehow make cartels inherently (un)stable is highly unlikely.  As a result, the distance to the EC should 
not have a direct effect on cartel duration (i.e., it can affect cartel duration only through its impact on 
cartel detection). 
Eqn. (2) further controls for firm size SIZE, because larger firms are more visible to the regulator, 
competitors, and consumers, thereby increasing the likelihood of informal complaints.  We use the firm’s 
sales growth (SALES_GROWTH), which may signal abnormally high product prices set by the cartel 




abusing its market power.  Moreover, to control for time-invariant industry and year-specific effects, we 
include industry and year fixed effects.  
– Insert Table 8 about here – 
Table 8, column (1), displays the results using matched control firms from all possible countries, 
whereas column (2) displays the results using matched control firms from low antitrust enforcement 
countries.  When we control for selection bias by using the IMR, we continue to find that transparent 
reporting reduces cartel duration (column (1): coeff. 1.020, z-stat. 1.92; column (2): coeff. 1.037, z-stat. 
2.01).  
Alternatively, by performing a sub-sample analysis that uses cartels that were not broken up by the 
regulator, we rule out the role of competition authorities in breaking up the cartels.  We identify these 
cases by including only cartels that ended before the start of the EC investigation.  Using the sub-sample 
of cartels that terminated due to natural causes, we find that the coefficient on FRT is positive and 
statistically significant.   
VII. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This study investigates whether reporting transparency affects product market coordination and 
competition.  We hypothesize that cartels following U.S. GAAP or IFRS exhibit higher reporting 
transparency through segment reporting.  We posit that greater transparency may increase cartel duration 
by reducing contracting costs.  Alternatively, greater transparency may decrease cartel duration by 
facilitating the detection of cheating behavior, thus increasing the cartel’s cost of deterrence or the 
likelihood of a price war when cartel members cheat and the cartel lacks effective ways of responding to 
cheating.  
Our results show that transparent reporting under U.S. GAAP and IFRS is associated with lower 
cartel duration, and that result is (partly) explained by the greater transparency of segment disclosures.  
Our cross-sectional tests show that the decrease in cartel duration under transparent reporting is more 
pronounced for cartels with a high likelihood of cheating than for cartels with a low likelihood of 




among firms, through earlier detection of cheating cartel members.  While results support the role of 
reporting transparency in cheating discovery, we find inconclusive results for contracting benefits of 
transparency in the cartel setting—possibly due to the low power of our tests, which try to “switch off” 
the effect of cheating.  
Our results remain robust to the use of transparency measures that are not affected by the choice of 
reporting under IFRS.  We also control for the selection bias resulting from our sample’s consisting of 
indicted cartels.  This self-selection control allows us to estimate an unbiased effect of reporting 
transparency on cartel duration for “observable” cartels that collapsed—an economically significant cartel 
population.   
Our study is the first to empirically analyze the effect of accounting disclosures on product market 
competition, thereby making three contributions to the literature.  First, while the disclosure literature 
examines how product markets shape accounting disclosures, we show that the reverse effect is possible 
and that transparent disclosures can shape product market outcomes.  Second, our study contributes to the 
literature on the verification role of audited financial statements by showing that the verification role of 
audited financial reporting extends to non-enforceable contracts.   Third, we add to the anti-trust literature 
by modeling the effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration.  Because reducing cartel duration 
decreases the deadweight loss induced by dampened product market competition, our results have 
important implications for antitrust authorities.  Additionally, our results point to spillover effects 
between capital market regulation and product markets, and show that improvements in reporting 
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Notes: This figure shows the Kaplan-Meier failure function for firms with low (FRT=0) and high (FRT=1) 
financial reporting transparency.  The functions for FRT=1 and FRT=0 are fitted from two separate Cox 
models using standardized values of the covariates shown in Table 3 column (1). FRT is an indicator 




Table 1: Sample distribution across countries 




firm-years % Cum. FRT 
    
0 1 
AUSTRALIA 5 0.47 0.47 5 0 
AUSTRIA 11 1.03 1.49 7 4 
BELGIUM 24 2.24 3.73 24 0 
CZECH REPUBLIC 2 0.19 3.92 2 0 
DENMARK 17 1.59 5.50 17 0 
FINLAND 36 3.36 8.86 28 8 
FRANCE 174 16.23 25.09 101 73 
GERMANY 146 13.62 38.71 104 42 
GREECE 3 0.28 38.99 3 0 
HONG KONG 5 0.47 39.46 5 0 
HUNGARY 10 0.93 40.39 0 10 
ITALY 36 3.36 43.75 10 26 
JAPAN 199 18.56 62.31 140 59 
KOREA (SOUTH) 3 0.28 62.59 3 0 
LUXEMBOURG 2 0.19 62.78 0 2 
NETHERLANDS 75 7.00 69.78 72 3 
NORWAY 3 0.28 70.06 3 0 
SINGAPORE 1 0.09 70.15 1 0 
SOUTH AFRICA 9 0.84 70.99 5 4 
SPAIN 44 4.10 75.09 44 0 
SWEDEN 25 2.33 77.43 20 5 
SWITZERLAND 18 1.68 79.10 2 16 
TAIWAN 6 0.56 79.66 6 0 
UNITED KINGDOM 80 7.46 87.13 78 2 
UNITED STATES 138 12.87 100.00 0 138 
Total 1,072 100.00 
 
680 392 





Table 2: Descriptive statistics  
 MEAN SD P25 P50 P75 N 
DUR 10.68 5.65 6.00 10.00 14.00 1,072 
FRT 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,072 
LENIENCY 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,072 
FINE 1.28 2.65 0.05 0.28 1.06 1,072 
REPEAT 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,072 
#MEMBER 18.11 13.31 11.00 13.00 21.00 1,072 
SIZE 15.78 1.54 14.78 15.83 17.01 1,072 
GDP_GROWTH 2.45 1.83 1.26 2.39 3.72 1,072 
ΔIND_SALES 0.22 1.90 –0.01 0.06 0.17 1,070 
ΔFOREIGN_SALES% 1.55 10.10 –0.54 0.38 2.56 1,050 
LOCAL_ENF 0.78 1.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,072 
GOOD_CG 0.46 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 1,058 
CHEAT: Trade association 0.78 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1,072 
CHEAT: Excess capacity 0.09 1.95 –0.70 –0.00 0.58 838 
CHEAT: Cost heterogeneity 3.81 2.47 1.98 3.45 4.88 915 
Notes:  DUR measures cartel duration in years.  FRT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm follows IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 
0 otherwise.  LENIENCY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respective cartel member made use of the leniency program, and 
0 otherwise.  FINE is the fine imposed by the EC as percentage of total assets.  REPEAT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
cartel firm is a repeat offender, and 0 otherwise.  #MEMBER is the total number of cartel members (listed and private firms).  SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets in US$.  GDP_GROWTH is the percentage change in GDP in each cartel member's country of 
incorporation over a given year.  ΔIND_SALES is the yearly percentage change in the sum of sales of all industry members in the 
same four-digit SIC code industry.  ΔFOREIGN_SALES% is the change in the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.  LOCAL_ENF is 
the yearly number of cartels convicted by local antitrust authorities, based on Connor (2014).  GOOD_CG is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the cartel firm’s country of origin has a high value for the anti-director-rights index, and 0 otherwise.  Trade 
association is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cartel does not use a trade association and 0 otherwise.  Excess capacity is the 
average change of inventory (scaled by total assets, and expressed in percent) of cartel members less the average change of 
inventory (scaled by total assets, and expressed in percent) of firms outside of the cartel matched by industry, country, and year.  We 
multiply the variable by –1, so that higher values of the variable (lower excess capacity) increase cheating rates.  Cost heterogeneity 






Table 3: Reporting transparency and cartel membership duration  
  
This table reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard model.  The dependent variable is the hazard rate.  A positive coefficient 
implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a lower expected lifetime of the firm in the cartel.  Negative coefficients imply a 
longer expected life. 
 Predicted 
signs (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FRT +/– 0.666** 1.061** 1.033* 0.920* 1.020* 1.061** 
  (2.04) (1.99) (1.93) (1.74) (1.90) (1.99) 
LENIENCY – –1.101*** –1.701*** –1.728*** –1.504*** –1.664*** –1.701*** 
  (2.82) (4.16) (4.28) (3.65) (4.13) (4.16) 
FINE +/– –0.189** –0.560*** –0.557*** –0.440*** –0.528*** –0.560*** 
  (2.09) (3.97) (3.92) (3.04) (3.70) (3.97) 
REPEAT +/– –0.444 –1.299* –1.346* –1.166 –1.196* –1.299* 
  (1.29) (1.84) (1.95) (1.44) (1.73) (1.84) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.012 –0.019 –0.019 –0.007 –0.018 –0.019 
  (1.03) (0.84) (0.84) (0.29) (0.79) (0.84) 
SIZE – –0.242** –0.388 –0.375 –0.393* –0.367 –0.388 
  (1.98) (1.59) (1.55) (1.86) (1.52) (1.59) 
GDP_GROWTH + 0.023 0.389* 0.383* 0.382* 0.340 0.389* 
  (0.29) (1.90) (1.89) (1.73) (1.45) (1.90) 
ΔIND_SALES +   0.185***    
    (2.72)    
ΔFOREIGN_SALES% +    0.024*   
     (1.80)   
LOCAL_ENF +/–     -0.337  
      (1.27)  
GOOD_CG +      5.619*** 
       (4.51) 
Country, industry, and 
year fixed effects  No Included Included Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2  6% 36% 36% 38% 37% 36% 
N  1,072 1,072 1,070 1,050 1,072 1,058 
Notes:  FRT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm follows IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  LENIENCY is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the respective cartel member made use of the leniency program, and 0 otherwise.  FINE is the fine imposed by 
the EC as percentage of total assets.  REPEAT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a cartel firm is a repeat offender, and 0 otherwise.  
#MEMBER is the total number of cartel members (listed and private firms).  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in US$.  
GDP_GROWTH is the percentage change in GDP in each cartel member's country of incorporation over a given year.  ΔIND_SALES is 
the yearly percentage change in the sum of sales of all industry members in the same four-digit SIC code industry.  
ΔFOREIGN_SALES% is the change in the ratio of foreign sales to total sales.  LOCAL_ENF is the yearly number of cartels convicted by 
local antitrust authorities, based on Connor (2014).  GOOD_CG is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cartel firm’s country of origin 
has a high value for the anti-director-rights index, and 0 otherwise.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust 




Table 4: Replicating analysis at the cartel level 
Panel A: Reporting transparency and cartel duration: cartel-year level of analysis 
This table reports on the effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration after aggregating data at the cartel-year level 
(N=391).  A positive coefficient of the Cox proportional hazard models implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a 
lower expected cartel lifetime.  Negative coefficients imply longer expected cartel duration. 
 Predicted signs (1) (2) 
FRT_CARTEL +/– 2.458* 3.259* 
  (1.85) (1.83) 
%LENIENCY – –0.998** –1.458** 
  (2.32) (2.41) 
FINE +/– –0.178 –0.193 
  (1.14) (0.96) 
%REPEAT +/– –0.023 0.519 
  (0.05) (0.91) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.001 0.005 
  (0.03) (0.26) 
GDP_GROWTH + –0.085 –0.141 
  (0.73) (1.01) 
Fixed effects?  No Industry 
Pseudo R2   5% 14% 
N  391 391 
Notes: FRT_CARTEL is the percentage of firms that follow IFRS or U.S. GAAP in a given cartel and year.  LENIENCY is the 
yearly percentage of cartel members that make use of the leniency program.  FINE is the cartel-year average of the fine imposed 
by the EC as percentage of total assets.  %REPEAT is the percentage of repeat offenders within a cartel.  #MEMBERS is the 
number of cartel members.  GDP_GROWTH is the yearly average GDP growth for the cartel members’ countries of origin.  Z-
statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Reporting transparency and cartel duration: cartel level of analysis 
This table reports on the effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration after aggregating data at the cartel level (N=98).  A 
positive coefficient of the Cox proportional hazard models implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a lower expected 
lifetime of the cartel.  Negative coefficients imply longer expected cartel duration. 
 Predicted signs (1) (2) 
GAAP_DIFF +/– 0.073** 0.084** 
  (2.30) (2.40) 
%LENIENCY – –0.445 –0.472 
  (1.49) (1.45) 
FINE +/– –0.000*** –0.000** 
  (2.65) (2.33) 
%REPEAT +/– –1.631*** –1.640** 
  (2.63) (2.05) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.035*** –0.033*** 
  (3.89) (3.35) 
Fixed effects?  No Industry 
Pseudo R2   4% 4% 
N  98 98 
Notes: GAAP_DIFF is the distance between local GAAP and U.S. GAAP, averaged across cartel members and multiplied by –1 
(based on Bae et al. 2008).  %LENIENCY is the percentage of cartel members that made use of the leniency program.  FINE is 
the cartel average of the fine imposed by the EC.  REPEAT is the percentage of repeat offenders in the cartel.  #MEMBER is the 
number of cartel members.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** 





Table 5: Reporting transparency, cheating and cartel duration 
This table examines whether the effect of reporting transparency on cartel duration is conditional on cross-sectional differences in 
the likelihood that a cartel member deviates from the cartel agreement.  The table reports the results of the Cox proportional hazard 
model, where the dependent variable is the hazard rate.  A positive coefficient implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus 
a lower expected lifetime of the cartel.  Negative coefficients imply a longer expected life. 
  Cheating proxy CHEAT = 







+ Excess capacity 
+ Cost heterogeneity 
 Predicted signs (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FRT +/– –0.313 1.553** –0.601 2.782 
  (0.35) (2.53) (0.50) (0.63) 
FRT×CHEAT + 1.980* 0.343** 0.497** 8.967** 
  (1.91) (2.03) (2.06) (2.07) 
CHEAT +/– –0.967 –0.159 –0.411* –3.070** 
  (1.33) (0.97) (1.87) (2.45) 
LENIENCY – –1.628*** –1.476*** –1.434*** 0.741 
  (4.29) (3.24) (2.58) (0.87) 
FINE +/– –0.669*** –0.378** –0.518*** –0.135 
  (3.68) (2.53) (2.61) (0.71) 
REPEAT +/– –1.027 –0.783 –1.877 0.819 
  (1.54) (1.26) (1.52) (0.88) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.026 –0.022 –0.034 –0.005 
  (1.05) (1.35) (1.52) (0.25) 
SIZE – –0.520** –0.406 –0.441 0.289 
  (2.02) (1.49) (1.00) (0.98) 
GDP_GROWTH + 0.341** 0.401* 0.460** 0.741 
  (2.05) (1.65) (2.05) (0.87) 
Country, industry, and  
year fixed effects?  All included All included All included Industry 
Unit of analysis?  Firm-year Firm-year Firm-year Cartel-year 
Pseudo R2   37% 38% 41% 27% 
N  1,072 838 915 207 
Notes:  Columns (1) - (3) use firm-year data and specify variables in the following way.  FRT is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if a firm follows IFRS or U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  CHEAT in column (1) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cartel 
does not use a trade association, and 0 otherwise.  CHEAT in column (2) is excess capacity, calculated as the average change of 
inventory (scaled by total assets) of cartel members less the average change of inventory (scaled by total assets, and expressed in 
percent) of firms outside of the cartel matched by industry, country, and year.  We multiply the variable by –1, so that higher values 
of the variable (lower excess capacity, and expressed in percent) increase cheating rates.  CHEAT in column (3) is cartel cost 
heterogeneity, defined as the standard deviation of EBIT over total assets for each cartel and year. All other control variables are  
defined as reported in Table 3.  Column (4) uses cartel-year data and defines all variables at the cartel-year level.  FRT is redefined 
as the percentage of firms that follow IFRS or U.S. GAAP in a given cartel and year (same as FRT_CARTEL in Table 4 panel A).  
CHEAT in column (4) is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the cartel has no trade association, and excess capacity and cost 
heterogeneity values are in the second or third tertile of their respective sample distributions, and 0 otherwise.  LENIENCY is the 
yearly percentage of cartel members that make use of the leniency program.  FINE is the cartel-year average of the fine imposed by 
the EC as a percentage of total assets.  %REPEAT is the percentage of repeat offenders within a cartel.  #MEMBERS is the number 
of cartel members.  SIZE is the average log of total assets in US$ in a given year.  GDP_GROWTH is the yearly average GDP 
growth for the cartel members’ countries of origin.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.  





Table 6: Financial reporting transparency, segment reporting, and cartel duration 
Panel A: Financial reporting transparency and segment reporting  
This table compares the average number of reported segments between firms reporting under transparent accounting standards (IFRS 
or U.S. GAAP) and those reporting under local GAAP.  
 (1) Full sample (2) Full sample after excluding 
U.S. GAAP firms 
(3) Switchers from local GAAP to IFRS 
 N No. of Segments N No. of Segments N No. of Segments 
FRT=0 680 3.19 680 3.19 85 2.73 









Notes: Column (1) compares the mean number of segments reported by quoted cartel members that follow IFRS or U.S. GAAP 
(FRT = 1) against the number of segments reported by firms following local GAAP (FRT = 0).  Column (2) compares the mean 
number of segments reported by quoted cartel members that follow IFRS (FRT = 1) against the number of segments reported by 
firms following local GAAP (FRT = 0).  Column (3) compares the mean number of reported segments before (FRT = 0) and after 
IFRS adoption (FRT = 1) for quoted cartel members that adopted IFRS during the sample period.  The bottom row reports the p-
value of the t-test, which compares means across the samples. 
Panel B: Cox proportional hazard model: firm level of analysis 
This table tests hypothesis 2 and examines whether transparent segment reporting affects cartel duration.  It shows the results of Cox 
proportional hazard models using cartel-firm-level data in columns (1) and (2).  The dependent variable is the hazard rate.  A positive 
coefficient implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a lower expected lifetime of the cartel.  Negative coefficients imply 
longer expected cartel duration. 
  SEGTRANS= 
  #Segments #Reclassifications 
 Predicted  signs (1) (2) 
SEGTRANS  +/– 0.298** 2.378*** 
  (2.32) (2.74) 
LENIENCY – –1.824*** –1.575*** 
  (4.04) (3.06) 
FINE +/– –0.562*** –0.608*** 
  (4.09) (2.86) 
REPEAT +/– –1.459* –1.191 
  (1.93) (1.29) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.026 –0.028 
  (1.20) (0.73) 
SIZE – –0.438* –0.362 
  (1.83) (1.48) 
GDP_GROWTH + 0.381* 0.249 
  (1.87) (1.51) 
Country, industry, and year FE?  Included Included 
Pseudo R2  36% 37% 
N  1,072 765 
Notes:  In column (1) SEGTRANS is the average number of segments reported by cartel firms in a given year.  In column (2) 
SEGTRANS is the average number of segment reclassifications in the cartel multiplied by –1, so that higher (lower) values of this 
variable indicate greater (lower) reporting transparency.  LENIENCY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respective cartel 
member made use of the leniency program, and 0 otherwise.  FINE is the fine imposed by the EC as percentage of total assets.  
REPEAT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a cartel firm is a repeat offender, and 0 otherwise.  #MEMBER is the total number of 
cartel members (listed and private firms).  SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in US$.  GDP_GROWTH is the percentage 
change in GDP in each cartel member's country of incorporation over a given year.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are 






Panel C: Segment reporting and cartel duration: cartel level of analysis 
This table tests hypothesis 2 and examines whether transparent segment reporting affects cartel duration.  It shows the results of 
Cox proportional hazard models using cartel-level data (N=98).  The dependent variable is the hazard rate.  A positive coefficient 
implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a lower expected lifetime of the cartel.  Negative coefficients imply longer 
expected cartel duration. 
 Predicted signs (1) (2) 
SEG_REQ +/– 1.557***  
  (3.68)  
SEGTRANS (#Reclassifications) +/–  2.517*** 
   (3.32) 
%LENIENCY – –0.589* –0.150 
  (1.82) (0.24) 
FINE +/– –0.000*** 0.000 
  (3.15) (1.61) 
%REPEAT +/– –1.308* –0.570 
 , (1.73) (0.47) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.030*** –0.024 
  (2.85) (1.43) 
Industry fixed effects?  Included Included 
Pseudo R2   5% 11% 
N  98 49 
Notes: SEG_REQ is the percentage of countries requiring segment reporting under local GAAP (item 3 in Bae et al. (2008)) in a 
given cartel.  SEGTRANS (#Reclassifications) is the average number of segment reclassifications in the cartel multiplied by –1, so 
that higher (lower) values of this variable indicate greater (lower) reporting transparency.  %LENIENCY is the percentage of cartel 
members that made use of the leniency program.  FINE is the cartel average of the fine imposed by the EC.  %REPEAT is the 
percentage of repeat offenders in the cartel.  #MEMBER is the number of cartel members (listed and private firms).  Z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 






Table 7: Controlling for the choice to adopt a transparent accounting framework 
This table controls for the sample selection bias due to voluntary IFRS adoption.  A positive coefficient of the Cox 
proportional hazard models implies a positive impact on the hazard rate and thus a lower expected cartel lifetime.  
Negative coefficients imply longer expected cartel duration. 
 
 Full sample 
Excluding U.S. 
firms 
U.S. GAAP vs. 
local GAAP 
 Predicted signs (1) (2) (3) 
FRT_PROP +/– 1.797** 1.915*  
  (2.23) (1.81)  
USGAAP +/–   21.589*** 
    (6.83) 
LENIENCY – –1.797*** –2.581*** –2.623** 
  (4.49) (4.39) (2.28) 
FINE +/– –0.597*** –0.756*** –0.189 
  (4.33) (5.26) (0.87) 
REPEAT +/– –1.382** –1.188 –0.494 
  (2.10) (1.47) (0.46) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.015 –0.026 –0.028 
  (0.63) (1.54) (1.20) 
SIZE – –0.437* –0.587* 0.047 
  (1.96) (1.69) (0.07) 
GDP_GROWTH + 0.434** 0.346 1.013 
  (2.11) (1.44) (1.58) 
Country, industry, 
and year fixed effects 
 Included Included Included 
Pseudo R2  36% 41% 51% 
N  1,072 934 606 
Notes:  In column (1), FRT_PROP equals 0 for firms that report under local GAAP and have no choice to report 
under IFRS, 1 for firms that face a mandatory requirement to report under U.S. GAAP, and a predicted (out-of-
sample) probability of adopting IFRS or local GAAP for firms that had a choice between IFRS and local GAAP.  
Column (2) uses the same model as column (1), but excludes U.S. firms.  Column (3) uses a sub-sample of firms that 
were required to use U.S. GAAP or local GAAP.  LENIENCY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respective 
cartel member made use of the leniency program, and 0 otherwise.   FINE is the fine imposed by the EC as 
percentage of total assets.  REPEAT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a cartel firm is a repeat offender, and 0 
otherwise.  #MEMBER is the total number of cartel members (listed and private firms).  SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets in US$.  GDP_GROWTH is the percentage change in GDP in each cartel member's country of 
incorporation over a given year.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors 






Table 8: Controlling for selection bias due to sampling of indicted cartels 
Panel A: First-stage probit estimation 
This table reports the results of the first-stage probit estimation using a sample of cartel firms (N = 1,072) and two different control 
samples of firms: (1) non-cartel firms from cartel countries, industries, and of similar size (column 1); and (2) non-cartel firms from 
countries with lax competition enforcement, but from cartel industries, and of similar size (column 2).  The dependent variable in (1) and 
(2) is DETECT, which equals 1 for cartel firms indicted by the EC for forming an illegal cartel, and 0 for the control firms. 




Control firms from cartel 
countries, industries, and 
similar size 
(2)  
Control firms from lax competition 
enforcement countries, cartel 
industries, and similar size 
DIST – –0.142*** –0.247*** 
  (5.71) (10.64) 
SIZE + 0.258*** 0.109* 
  (3.74) (1.65) 
SALES_GROWTH + 0.666*** 1.402*** 
  (3.60) (4.33) 
ROA + 0.048 0.751 
  (0.06) (0.66) 
Industry and year fixed effects  Included Included 
Pseudo R2  25% 52% 
N  2,144 2,144 
Notes:  The dependent variable is an indicator that equals 1 for cartel firms, and 0 for non-cartel (control) firms.  DIST is the (minimum) 
distance in thousand miles between the headquarters of (cartel) firms and the EC’s headquarter in Brussels.  SIZE is the natural logarithm 
of total assets in US$.  SALES_GROWTH is the firm’s percentage change in sales over a year.  ROA is the firm’s return on assets, 
measured as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust 
standard errors clustered by cartel-firm.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel B: Second-stage proportional hazard model 
This table shows the results of the second-stage proportional hazard model that includes the inverse Mills ratios from Panel A.  In the 
Cox proportional hazard model estimations, the dependent variable is the hazard rate, and a positive coefficient implies a positive impact 




Control firms from cartel 
countries, cartel industries, and 
similar size 
(2) 
Control firms from lax competition 
enforcement countries, cartel 
industries, and similar size  
FRT +/– 1.020* 1.037** 
  (1.92) (2.01) 
LENIENCY – –1.781*** –1.722*** 
  (3.70) (4.00) 
FINE +/– –0.562*** –0.557*** 
  (3.89) (4.01) 
REPEAT +/– –1.229 –1.267* 
  (1.62) (1.65) 
#MEMBER +/– –0.020 –0.020 
  (0.91) (0.90) 
SIZE – –0.478 –0.404 
  (1.42) (1.51) 
GDP_GROWTH + 0.378* 0.381* 
  (1.86) (1.84) 
MILLS +/– –0.456 –0.215 
  (0.46) (0.23) 
Country, industry, and year fixed effects  Included Included 
Pseudo R2  36% 36% 




Notes:  In column (1), cartel firms are matched to non-cartel (control) firms in the same country, the four-digit SIC code, year, and of 
similar size.  In column (2), cartel firms are matched to non-cartel (control) firms from countries with lax competition enforcement, but 
from the same four-digit SIC code and year, and are of similar size.  FRT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm follows IFRS or 
U.S. GAAP, and 0 otherwise.  LENIENCY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the respective cartel member made use of the leniency 
program, and 0 otherwise.  FINE is the fine imposed by the EC as percentage of total assets.  REPEAT is an indicator variable that equals 
1 if a cartel firm is a repeat offender, and 0 otherwise.  #MEMBER is the total number of cartel members (listed and private firms).  SIZE 
is the natural logarithm of total assets in US$.  GDP_GROWTH is the percentage change in GDP in each cartel member's country of 
incorporation over a given year.  MILLS is the inverse Mills ratio calculated using the coefficient estimates from the first-stage 
regressions in Panel A column (1) and column (2), respectively.  Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by cartel-firm.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
